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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 82, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, 
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Charging—Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13210 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF PARKS 
AND RECREATION), 
Respondent. 
ROWLEY, FORREST, O'DONNELL & HITE P.C. (DAVID C. ROWLEY 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. MCDOWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
State Inspection, Security and Law Enforcement Employees, District 
Council 82, American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO (Council 82) to a decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) dismissing its charge against the State of 
New York (Office of Parks and Recreation) (State). Council 82 
alleges in its charge that the State violated §209-a.l(e) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to pay 
unit employees who had been reallocated in December 1991-7 to a 
-'•'Park Patrol Officers were reallocated from salary grade (SG) 12 
to SG 13 and Park Patrol Sergeants were reallocated from SG 15 to 
SG 16. 
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higher salary grade a longevity payment-'' in the amount set forth 
in the contractual salary schedule for those higher salary grades. 
Council 82 argues that employees who are upgraded through 
reallocation are entitled under §11.7 of the expired 1988-91 
contract to receive the longevity amounts at the higher salary 
grade. -f 
After considering negotiating history, the Assistant Director 
concluded that §11.7 of the parties7 expired contract called for a 
salary computation under which a longevity payment retained the 
dollar value assigned to the salary grade in which the longevity 
had been earned despite any subsequent change in salary grade, 
whether by promotion, demotion, reclassification or reallocation. 
Section 11.7(a) of the parties7 1988-91 contract provides that 
"longevity payments as set out in the salary schedule in Appendix 
'A' will be provided to employees upon completion of 10, 15 and 20 
years of continuous service." Section 11.7(d) provides: 
Such longevity payments will be added to and considered 
part of base pay for all purposes except for determining 
an employee's change in salary upon movement to a 
different salary grade and his potential for movement to 
the job rate of the new grade, after which determination 
the longevity payments will be restored. 
Council 82 argues that although §11.7(d) is an exception to 
the longevity payment obligation under §11.7(a), the exception does 
-'Longevity payments are made for 10, 15 and 20 years of service. 
The amount of the longevity varies by length of service and 
salary grade. 
-
7A successor agreement for the period April 1, 1991 through 
March 31, 1995 was reached in or about July 1992; it continues 
the relevant terms of the expired agreement. 
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not apply to reallocations because employees who are receiving a 
longevity payment when reallocated will always be at or above the 
job rate of the new salary grade,-7 such that they do not have any 
"potential for movement to the job rate of the new grade". 
Council 82 argues that the Assistant Director incorrectly ignored 
this plain and clear language in reaching his decision, one which 
allegedly effects absurd results, incorrectly relied upon 
negotiating history, and incorrectly declined to take official 
notice of a proposal made by the State during negotiations for a 
successor to the 1988-91 agreement. The State argues that the 
Assistant Director's ruling and decision are correct and should be 
affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, including those made at oral argument, we affirm the 
Assistant Director's ruling and decision. 
We find the controlling provisions of §11.7 of the parties' 
agreement, and most particularly §11.7(d), to be extremely 
ambiguous. Resort to the negotiating history which was offered by 
both parties to clarify that ambiguity was, therefore, necessary 
and permissible. On this record, that negotiating history is 
simply not consistent with the interpretation of §11.7(d) urged by 
Council 82. Indeed, to reach the interpretation urged by 
Council 82, the State's witness on negotiating history would have 
to be entirely discredited in relevant respect. There is, however, 
) -''Although not material to our disposition of the charge, it 
appears that this statement is not accurate as to 10-year 
longevity payments. 
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no basis to disturb the Assistant Director's credibility 
determination. Given that determination, there is no record 
evidence that the State discontinued the cited provisions of the 
1988-91 contract in its salary calculations for the reallocated 
positions notwithstanding claims of irrationality of result and, 
therefore, no basis upon which to premise a violation of 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
Council 82 also excepts to the Assistant Director's 
declination to take official notice of an exhibit received in 
evidence during a fact-finding hearing involving Council 82 and the 
State held as part of the impasse resolution procedure pertaining 
to negotiations for a successor to the 1988-91 agreement. The 
taking of such notice was discretionary with the Assistant 
Director.-7 The request having first been made of the Assistant 
Director in Council 82's post-hearing brief, we find no abuse of 
discretion in his ruling. Moreover, even had notice been taken of 
the exhibit, it would only have established the fact that the State 
had made a proposal to modify §11.7(d) by deleting the reference to 
movement to the job rate. The making of such a negotiating 
proposal would not, however, conclusively prove that §11.7(d) is 
inapplicable to reallocations absent evidence supporting that 
conclusion. The State, for example, might have made the proposal 
simply to avoid any possibility that §11.7(d) would be interpreted 
in the way Council 8 2 urges, rather than as an admission that 
^N.Y. A.P.A. §306(4); Fisch, New York Evidence, §§1048, 1049, 
1065 (2d Ed. 1977 & 1994-95 Supp.). 
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§11.7(d) is inapplicable to reallocations. Additional evidence 
concerning the history and discussion of the State's proposal 
conceivably could have established the truth of Council 82 's 
assertion, but receipt of that evidence would necessitate a 
reopening of the record, which is not warranted-7 and has not been 
requested. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Assistant Director's 
decision and ruling are affirmed and Council 82's exceptions are 
dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
-See, e.g. , City of Yonkers. 10 PERB ?[3020 (1977) . 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, APL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11820 
TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL S. BAMBERGER of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
COOPER, SAPIR & COHEN (DAVID M. COHEN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Brookhaven (Town) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) finding that it violated §209-a.l(d)1/ of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act). The ALJ held that the Town 
unilaterally stopped using employees in the unit represented by 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to transport, set up, and dismantle a 
portable dance floor owned by the Town and used on the occasion 
in question by the Stony Brook Theatre Dance Guild (Guild). The 
i'The ALJ dismissed the allegation that §209-a.l(a) of the Act 
had been violated. No exceptions were taken to that part of the 
ALJ's decision. 
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Guild is a not-for-profit organization which is neither 
affiliated with nor sponsored by the Town. 
The stipulated record establishes that prior to March 1990, 
whenever the Guild requested the use of the dance floor for one 
of its programs, the Town would have unit employees, usually a 
crew of three, transport the dance floor to whatever location the 
Guild specified, set it up, dismantle it and transport it back to 
the Town for storage. The Guild requested the use of the dance 
floor for a March 25, 1990 program. The Town informed the Guild 
that although it would no longer transport, set up and dismantle 
the dance floor, it would allow the Guild to borrow the dance 
floor and return it to the Town after the program was complete. 
The Guild did so on March 25. 
The ALJ found that the Town had violated the Act by 
unilaterally transferring work that had been exclusively 
performed by unit members to the Guild or its agents. The Town 
excepts to the ALJ's determination, arguing that it has the 
managerial right to stop providing a service that it previously 
provided. CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
A public employer generally violates the Act by unilaterally 
reassigning unit work to nonunit personnel when the reassigned 
work has been performed exclusively by unit employees and the 
reassigned work is substantially similar to the work previously 
I 
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performed by the unit.-7 The stipulated record in this case 
shows that the at-issue work has always been performed by the 
employees represented by CSEA. The record further evidences no 
deviation in the type of or manner in which the work is now being 
performed, although by the Guild. The analysis of the case does 
not end there, however, as the Town has asserted that it has made 
a managerial decision to abolish or curtail a service which it 
previously offered and that such a decision need not be 
negotiated. 
We have long held that it is a managerial prerogative to 
abolish a service.-' In considering whether a service has been 
abolished or merely transferred for performance by an agent, we 
look to the level of control exercised by the public employer.-7 
Here, the Town has retained ownership and possession of the dance 
floor, at least to the extent that it continues to store it on 
Town property. However, this record provides no support for a 
finding that the Town exercises anything but this de minimis 
control over the dance floor or its use by the Guild. What is 
involved in this case is a temporary loan of property gratis. 
g/Niagara-Frontier Transp. Auth.f 18 PERB f3083 (1985). 
^Citv Sch. Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB fl3 060 
(1971). 
-
7See Saratoga Springs Sch. Dist.. 11 PERB f3037 (1978), aff7d. 
68 A.D.2d 202, 12 PERB 1[7008 (3d Dep't 1979), motion for leave 
to appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 711, 12 PERB [^7012 (1979). See also 
Co. of Erie fErie Co. Med. Ctr.K 28 PERB ^3015 (March 22, 1995); 
Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Long Beach, 
26 PERB 5[3065 (1993) . 
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The Town placed no restrictions on the use of the dance floor by 
the Guild, the manner in which it was to be transported or by 
whom, the locations where or the purpose for which it could be 
used. The Guild is unaffiliated with the Town in any way, it 
receives no support from the Town, it has no contractual 
relationship with the Town and it does not hold its performances 
on Town property. The only specific control exercised by the 
Town on this record is that it has given its permission to the 
Guild to use the dance floor. The Town has also tacitly approved 
the presence of the Guild agents on Town property to pick up and 
return the dance floor. This is a type and level of control 
markedly different from that exercised by public employers in 
other cases in which we have held there to have been an improper 
transfer of unit work. 
We have previously found that the use of non-paid volunteers 
to perform unit work violates the Act when the public employer 
continues to exercise control over the solicitation and 
scheduling of the volunteers-7. The Town has not solicited 
assistance from the Guild and it does not schedule the events at 
which the dance floor is to be used. Unlike County of 
Chautauqua,-1 in which the public employer actively facilitated 
the transfer of unit work to a private, not-for-profit 
5/Citv of Schenectady, 25 PERB ?[3073 (1992). 
^21 PERB 1[3057 (1988) . 
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corporation, the only facilitation here is that the Town allows 
the Guild on its property to gain access to the dance floor. 
As we view it, the Town has discontinued the delivery of a 
previously provided service, one that it was under no obligation 
to undertake in the first place. The Town now exercises no 
control over the delivery, set-up or return of the dance floor. 
Under these circumstances, we find that the Town did not 
unilaterally reassign unit work to nonunit personnel; rather it 
has discontinued the service altogether. Its decision to do so 
is not subject to mandatory negotiation. That a private 
organization is now, through no solicitation by the Town, 
providing the service to itself, with virtually no facilitation 
by the Town, does not warrant a contrary conclusion. 
By reason of the foregoing, we grant the Town's exceptions 
and reverse the ALJ's decision that the Town violated §2 09-a.l(d) 
of the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
i 
fAM,:4 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
2C- 3/22/95 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DOROTHY GERSTENFELD, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15942 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK AND UNITED FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
DOROTHY GERSTENFELD, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Dorothy 
Gerstenfeld to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing an improper 
practice charge she filed alleging that the City School District 
of the City of New York (District) and the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT) had violated, respectively, §209-a.l(e) and 
§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) notified Gerstenfeld, on 
September 12, 1994, that the charge was deficient because she had 
no standing to allege a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act and 
there were not any facts alleged in support of her conclusory 
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allegations of violation.-7 On September 22, 1994, Gerstenfeld 
informed the Assistant Director that she was seeking 
corroboration from the District and UFT of the statements set 
forth in her charge and that she would not withdraw the 
charge.& By a sworn statement dated September 28, 1994, 
Gerstenfeld advised the Assistant Director that she was 
correcting her pleading as to the §209-a.l(e) allegation, but she 
did not indicate what sections of the Act she was now alleging 
had been violated by the District. As to both the District and 
UFT, she reiterated the conclusory allegations contained in the 
charge, but provided no facts in support of those allegations.-7 
The Director dismissed the charge, finding that Gerstenfeld 
had no standing to allege a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Act 
and that she had failed to provide specific facts which would 
establish the violations alleged. 
-'Gerstenfeld alleged, inter alia, that the District had 
improperly "administered" her role as librarian, Chancellor's 
regulations and established practices and policies; failed to 
comply with school restructuring regulations; and violated the 
Act in hiring practices. As against UFT, her allegations 
included failure to support employee complaints, failure to share 
grievance decisions, failure to show leadership to preserve terms 
and conditions of employment and improper collection of agency 
fees. 
-'No statements in response to Gerstenfeld's request were 
received from either the District or UFT. 
-''Gerstenfeld referred to an "ongoing and continuous pattern and 
policy of violations of her agency member rights" by UFT and the 
District's failure to take "any remedial or corrective measures" 
) regarding the denial of her sabbatical leave request and denial 
of her "protected and professional rights." 
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Gerstenfeld excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that 
his decision was premature, that it was in retaliation for her 
filing of a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request with 
PERB-7 and that the noted deficiencies in her charge had been 
corrected. 
We affirm the Director's decision to dismiss Gerstenfeld's 
charge for the reasons set forth below. 
We have previously held that an individual bargaining unit 
employee does not have the right to act in the place of the 
bargaining agent and file charges relating to alleged violations 
of the employer's bargaining duties.-7 Therefore, we affirm the 
Director's dismissal of the §209-a.l(e) allegation as Gerstenfeld 
had no standing to allege such a violation of the Act. 
Our Rules of Procedure (Rules) require a charging party to 
supply a clear and concise statement of the facts which support 
the alleged violations of the Act.-7 Gerstenfeld's charge 
-
70n October 3, 1994, Gerstenfeld requested PERB's Records Access 
Officer to provide her with information pursuant to FOIL about 
PERB's administration and also all decisions relating to the 
District, UFT and agency fees. Gerstenfeld was given the 
information about PERB's structure in an October 5, 1994 letter 
from PERB's Records Access Officer and was directed to the 
published volumes of PERB's decisions for the decisions she 
sought. Gerstenfeld later reviewed those decisions in PERB's 
Brooklyn office. 
^City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 22 PERB 53 012 (1989); 
Queens College of the City Univ. of New York, 21 PERB 53024 
(1988) . 
e/Rules §204.1(b) (3) . 
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contains no facts upon which a finding of a violation could be 
based. The Director afforded Gerstenfeld an opportunity to 
correct the deficiencies in the charge. Gerstenfeld responded 
with additional conclusory statements. The Director then 
properly dismissed the charge. That Gerstenfeld had made a FOIL 
request to review all previously issued PERB decisions involving 
the District, UFT and agency fee issues, which could not correct 
the deficiencies in her charge, does not extend her time to 
correct the noted deficiencies or require the Director to hold in 
abeyance his determination that the charge is deficient.^ 
Gerstenfeld's exception alleging in conclusory fashion that the 
Director's decision was issued in retaliation for her filing a, 
FOIL request is without merit and is simply one more allegation 
similar to the conclusory allegations which constitute her 
charge. The Director's decision in this case is consistent with 
our prior decisions in similar cases and the facts and the law 
fully support his dismissal of the charge. Further, the Director 
had no involvement in responding to the FOIL request and, when 
later apprised of it, facilitated Gerstenfeld's access to the 
requested information. 
Based on the above, the Director's dismissal of the charge 
is affirmed and Gerstenfeld's exceptions are dismissed. 
^County of Suffolk, 26 PERB 53076 (1993). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, 
huUz^Z0. 
Chairperson 
Walter-i. Eisenberg, Member 
2D- 3/22/95 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOYCE TARTOW, 
Charging Party, 
=and= CASE-NO.—U-1600 9— 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OP THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
JOYCE TARTOW, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Joyce Tartow to 
a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing as deficient her charge 
against the Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York (District) and the United Federation of Teachers 
(UFT). Tartow alleges in her charge that the District violated 
§2 09-a.l(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
and that the UFT breached its duty of fair representation in 
violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act. 
The Director dismissed the charge after Tartow had amended 
it and after she had submitted many additional supporting 
documents. The Director held that the charge was untimely as to 
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incidents prior to May 30, 1994,-1 and that Tartow's conclusory 
allegations failed to set forth any facts which would establish 
the elements of the violations of the Act alleged. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the Director's 
decision. We do so having considered all allegations and 
supporting documents, including those Tartow alleges should be 
considered timely. 
Tartow7s charge against the District requires that facts be 
alleged evidencing employment discrimination in retaliation for 
an exercise of rights protected by the Act. Tartow's pleadings, 
read most favorably to her, evidence only a claim that the 
District forced her to retire in violation of the collective 
bargaining agreement, Chancellor's regulations and District 
policies in the context of a history of personnel problems. Her 
retirement may have been "wrong", as Tartow alleges, on any of 
these theories and litigable in other forums, but there is 
nothing in her charge to evidence that any exercise of rights 
protected by the Act caused the District to take any action 
against her. 
The charge against UFT requires an allegation of facts which 
establish arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct by the 
UFT in its representation of her employment interests. There is 
little in the charge or supporting documents related to the UFT, 
but what there is appears to center on Tartow's conclusory 
^Earlier acts occurred more than four months before the filing 
date of the charge. 
Board - U-16009 -3 
allegation that the UFT did not help her combat perceived 
contract violations and other abuses by the District. As the 
Director correctly observed, however, there is nothing in the 
charge to show that the UFT was ever specifically asked to do 
anything. Tartow's theory of violation appears to be that the 
UFT should have initiated grievances for her on its own because 
it was aware of the adverse circumstances confronting her. 
However, without evidence of a specific request for assistance 
and an arbitrary refusal, we cannot find even an arguable 
violation of UFT's duty of fair representation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and Tartow's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
WalterjL. Eisenberg, Member 




STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EASTCHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4193 
EASTCHESTER UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JEFFREY R. CASSIDY, for Petitioner 
RAINS & P06REBIN, P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL and CRAIG R. 
BENSON), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Eastchester 
Union Free School District (District) to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) on a petition filed by the Eastchester Teachers 
Association, New York State United Teachers (Association). The 
Association has petitioned to add teaching assistants to the unit 
of professional personnel it currently represents. In its 
response to the petition, the District alleged, inter alia, that 
the teaching assistants were already represented in a separate 
unit by the Eastchester Teaching Assistants (ETA). 
After a hearing, the Director concluded that although the 
ETA had represented teaching assistants as an employee 
organization in the past, it was defunct and/or no longer 
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interested in representing the teaching assistants on the date of 
the petition. Upon that finding, the Director determined that 
the teaching assistants were most appropriately added to the 
Association's unit. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the record does 
not support the Director's decision that the ETA is defunct or 
disinterested and that his "novel" unit determination, which 
allegedly minimizes or disregards the teaching assistants' 
separate uniting, is inconsistent with our decisions. The 
Association argues in response that the Director's decision 
should be affirmed and that we should reject a letter sent to the 
Director after his decision in which a representative of the ETA 
expresses a continuing interest in representing the teaching 
assistants. 
The Director's unit determination is premised entirely upon 
his finding regarding ETA's status and interests. Any review of 
that unit determination, therefore, must begin with an 
examination of the bases for his findings in those respects. 
The District's response to the petition was the first notice 
the Director received regarding ETA's representation of the 
teaching assistants. By letter to two representatives of the ETA 
dated December 22, 1993,-' the Director informed them that the 
District had raised a question concerning ETA's status as the 
-''Although these letters were not introduced into evidence at the 
hearing, they are documents in this case file of which we may 
take official notice. N.Y. A.P.A. §306(4); Fisch, New York 
Evidence, §1065 (2d Ed. 1977 & 1994-95 Supp.). 
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negotiating agent for the teaching assistants. The Director 
enclosed a notice of conference to the ETA representatives and 
then stated: "If you are the negotiating agent for the position 
of teaching assistant and desire to so remain, please attend the 
conference. If not, I will assume that your absence evidences a 
disclaimer of any representation interest." No ETA 
representatives responded or attended the conference. The 
Director later sent a notice of hearing to ETA and to one of its 
representatives, but ETA did not appear at the April 13, 1994 
hearing. At the hearing, the Director stated to the District's 
attorney that he had "contacted the Eastchester Teaching 
Assistants" and he had been "led to understand that ETA does not 
wish to represent the [teaching assistant] unit in that it has 
specifically disclaimed such a representational interest . . . ." 
Upon inquiry of the District at that time, the District's 
attorney confirmed that he did not have any information that ETA 
was then still functioning or that it intended to continue to 
represent the unit. There is no other correspondence to or from 
ETA or its representatives in the Director's case file. 
In his August 31, 1994 decision, the Director found that ETA 
"has specifically disclaimed any representational interest in the 
unit and [it] has apparently been dissolved. Indeed, neither 
party is contesting that the organization is no longer in 
existence." 
On October 13, 1994, after the Director's decision, Gail 
DelVecchio, one of the ETA representatives with whom the Director 
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had earlier corresponded, sent the Director the letter referenced 
in the District's exceptions and the Association's response. In 
that letter, DelVecchio denies that any ETA representatives had 
ever specifically disclaimed a representational interest. 
DelVecchio also states that in a conversation she had with the 
Director after receipt of his December 22, 1993 letter, she 
"explained that I could not attend [the conference] but was still 
very much interested in representing [teaching assistants].11 
Without regard to DelVecchio's post-hearing letter, we find 
it appropriate to remand the case to the Director. Confining our 
review to the record before the Director, we find no evidence to 
support a finding that ETA was or is defunct. Moreover, as the 
decision is written, the conclusion that ETA had no interest in 
representing the teaching assistants appears to have been based 
upon some affirmative disclaimer of interest actually made by a 
representative of ETA. The Director's decision is not based upon 
a deemed disclaimer of interest stemming from ETA's failure to 
appear or articulate a position on the petition for the record. 
Therefore, we will not review the appropriateness of the unit 
determination as if it were made upon such a finding. We are 
persuaded from our review of the record and the Director's 
decision that there may have been some confusion regarding ETA's 
status and interests. As the findings made regarding ETA's 
status and its representation interests were critical to the 
Director's unit determination, clarification of those issues is 
necessary if we are to properly review his unit determination. 
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The investigatory nature of the representation process and the 
Legislature's directives in §207 of the Act regarding determina-
tions of the appropriate unit fully warrant a remand in this 
rather unusual context. 
For the reasons set forth above, the case is remanded for 
further proceedings and decision consistent with our decision and 
order herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
% Pa 
M ~ Lk^Jj 
l i n e R. Kinse l la , airperson 
Jalter^ij . Eisenberg, Member ( 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
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In the Matter of 
AFSCME NEW YORK, COUNCIL 66, LOCAL 1095 
(ERIE COUNTY BLUE COLLAR EMPLOYEES UNION), 
Charging Party, 
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JOEL M. POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME 
New York, Council 66, Local 1095 (Erie County Blue Collar 
Employees Union) (AFSCME) to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALT) . After a hearing, the ALT dismissed AFSCME's charge 
against the County of Erie (Erie County Medical Center) (County). 
AFSCME alleges that the County violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
subcontracted security services at the Women, Infant and 
Children's Supplemental Food Program (WIC)-7 at Old School 84, 
an office located on the Erie County Medical Center (ECMC) 
campus. 
-
7WIC is a federally-funded program administered locally by the 
County under a contract with the State of New York. 
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The ALT dismissed the §209-a.l(a) allegation for lack of 
proof. She dismissed the §2 09-a.l(d) allegation because AFSCME 
had not established exclusivity over security work no matter how 
that unit work might reasonably be defined. 
AFSCME's exceptions are directed only to the bargaining 
allegations resting upon the unilateral subcontract of security 
services at the WIC office. In that respect, AFSCME argues 
basically that the ALJ's decision is contrary to existing case 
law. The County has not responded to the exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered AFSCME's 
exceptions, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Prior to the subcontract in issue, unit employees provided 
security everywhere on the ECMC campus, except for the Geneva B. 
Scruggs Intermediate Care Facility (Scruggs). Scruggs, a not-
for-profit, State-funded program, has always used a private 
security force. Security for the other not-for-profit tenant on 
the ECMC campus is provided by personnel in AFSCME's unit. 
AFSCME had the burden to show exclusivity over the unit 
work.-7 Security on the ECMC grounds has not, in fact, been 
rendered exclusively by unit personnel. Had AFSCME shown that 
the County had no effective control over the use of private 
security at Scruggs, an argument might have been made that a 
discernible boundary existed which would have preserved AFSCME's 
exclusivity over security services elsewhere on the ECMC campus. 
g/Niaqara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB 53083 (1985). 
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We simply do not know from this record, however, whether the 
County ordered private security for Scruggs, permitted it, or had 
no control over that decision. If Scruggs alone controlled its 
security decisions, AFSCME's exclusivity over security elsewhere 
on ECMC grounds might have been preserved. Perhaps the most 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the County's delivery of 
security services for the one other not-for-profit entity on the 
ECMC grounds is that the County has power and control over all 
decisions affecting the security of its premises. Such a 
conclusion would clearly necessitate dismissal of the charge 
because it then is the County which effectively decided to use 
private security at Scruggs and the County's decision in that 
regard pierced AFSCME's exclusivity even within the boundary 
AFSCME proposes.-7 Our conclusion that AFSCME has not proven 
that the County lacked control over the security decisions at 
Scruggs necessitates dismissal of the charge. AFSCME's arguments 
assume the County's lack of control, but we cannot premise a 
violation of the Act on an assumption about a dispositive 
issue.-7 Therefore, there is no factual basis upon which to 
draw any discernible boundary to the on-campus security which 
would preserve AFSCME's exclusivity over the security work at the 
-'AFSCME would define the unit work as security officer work at 
ECMC-controlled or administered buildings and grounds on the ECMC 
campus. 
) ^State of New York fDep't of Correctional Services), 27 PERB 
53021 (1994). 
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WIC office. There being no showing of exclusivity, the ALJ 
properly refrained from a discussion of any other issues. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and AFSCME's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
4i-- i,K-4v 
Pauline R. Kmsel la , Chairperson 
Walte Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric J\ Schmertz, Member 
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CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, DUTCHESS 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Wappingers Central School District (District) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge against the 
District filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Dutchess Educational Local 8 67, 
Wappingers Central School District (CSEA). The charge alleges 
that the District unilaterally subjected a unit employee in the 
title of health aide-typist to a physical strength test in 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). After a hearing, the ALJ held that the District had 
violated the Act as alleged because the test imposed was 
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unrelated to the duties of a health aide-typist as actually 
performed over time or as could be required. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's 
decision is not supported by or is contrary to the record, that 
her conclusions of law are incorrect, that the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation, who held the hearing,-' 
either failed to rule or ruled incorrectly with respect to 
District motions and defenses, and that the Director improperly 
assisted CSEA by making a motion to amend the charge on its 
behalf during the hearing. 
CSEA argues in its response to the District's exceptions 
that the rulings at and the conduct of the hearing were correct 
and proper and that the ALJ's decision should be affirmed on the 
facts and law as found and applied. CSEA has filed a cross-
exception to the Director's ruling denying CSEA's request to 
reopen the record for the purpose of introducing the job 
description for the title of health aide, a position which is not 
in CSEA's unit. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision and dismiss the 
District's exceptions in all respects. 
We turn first to the exceptions concerning the Director's 
rulings and his conduct of the hearing. 
i -''The ALJ was substituted after the hearing as permitted under 
§2 04.7(a) of the Rules of Procedures. 
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The Director reserved decision on the District's motions to 
dismiss as made during the hearing. Those motions were 
necessarily denied by the ALJ's determination that the District 
had violated the Act.-7 The ALT having denied those motions, 
the question becomes whether those rulings were correct. 
The District first moved to dismiss the charge for failure 
to state a cause of action. That motion, of course, is directed 
to the allegations in the charge. The District contends that the 
charge is deficient as a matter of law because CSEA did not plead 
in the charge that the strength tests as administered were not 
reasonably related to the duties which could be assigned to a 
health aide-typist. 
CSEA's charge rests upon a claimed unilateral change in a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. The charge as filed alleged a 
change in practice and it identified the subject matter of that 
change. The relationship, if any, of the test to the duties of 
the position in issue affects, at most, only the negotiability of 
the test, an issue for our determination. Moreover, an 
allegation that the test is not related to the duties of the 
position is conclusory. CSEA was neither required to plead a 
conclusion of fact nor to plead an ultimate conclusion of law. A 
charge need only give fair notice of the actions intended to be 
g/See Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo, 
24 PERB 5(3033 (1991) (motion to dismiss denied by decision 
finding a violation of the Act) (subsequent history omitted). 
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proved as violations of the Act-7 and CSEA's charge was clearly 
sufficient under that standard. 
The District also moved to dismiss the charge after the end 
of CSEA's direct case for failure to establish a prima facie 
violation. The District argues in this respect that, apart from 
its pleading failure, CSEA also failed to prove the absence of a 
reasonable relationship between the test and the duties of a 
health aide-typist. On CSEA's direct case, however, there was 
evidence as to the nature of the test administered, the change in 
prior practice and to the duties of a health aide-typist. That 
proof was plainly sufficient to establish a prima facie case of a 
refusal to bargain premised upon a unilateral change in practice, 
even without giving CSEA the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences, as we do in deciding the disposition of such motions 
to dismiss.-7 
The Director also denied, upon CSEA's objection, the 
District's motion to amend its answer to add a timeliness defense 
which was made for the first time at the beginning of the 
hearing. The District does not specifically allege in its 
exceptions that the Director's ruling at the hearing was 
incorrect, only that the ALJ refused to consider timeliness. 
However, as the ALJ's decision was limited by the Director's 
prior ruling, that ruling is indirectly challenged by the 
-''Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n (Dennis) , 26 PERB ^3059 (1993) . 
^Professional Staff Congress/CUNY CVersia) , 23 PERB ?[3 03 0, aff'a 
23 PERB [^4501 (1990) . 
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District. Having determined that the correctness of the 
Director's ruling is before us, we affirm that ruling. 
The District had not raised timeliness as a defense to the 
charge in its answer as required by our Rules-7 and our 
decisions.-7 As to the motion, there was no explanation offered 
by the District as to why it could not have raised a timeliness 
defense before the hearing upon facts clearly within the 
possession and control of the District. Accordingly, there was 
no abuse of discretion in the Director's refusal to grant the 
motion made at that time.-7 
The District's allegation that the Director improperly 
assisted CSEA by making a motion on its behalf at the hearing is 
without basis. Following CSEA's examination of a witness, the 
Director merely inquired of CSEA's attorney as to whether he 
intended to amend the charge to include facts regarding a 
physical examination of a second unit employee. The amendment 
was clear in context and did not in any way change the nature or 
theory of the charge. Therefore, there was no abuse of 
discretion in the Director's inquiry to CSEA regarding its intent 
and similarly no abuse in his granting the amendment. 
^Rules §204.3(c)(2). 
^Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., 13 PERB f3014 (1980). 
z/Town of Brookhaven, 26 PERB [^3066 (1993) . 
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The District's remaining exceptions are essentially that the 
decision is incorrect as a matter of fact and law. We disagree 
and affirm for the reasons outlined below. 
The position in issue is a health aide-typist. Apparently 
in contemplation of using incumbents of this position to 
physically assist handicapped students, the District required 
Theresa Chambers, and several other health aide-typists, to 
submit to physical examinations. During the examination, the 
employees were subjected by a physician to certain strength tests 
which were designed to determine each employee's physical ability 
to perform the tasks associated with assisting handicapped 
students with their needs. The physician's report on Chambers 
states that she was being examined for the position of "health 
aide", a separate position created by the District in 1993 
specifically to assist with handicapped students. The physician 
determined that Chambers was not physically fit to be a health 
aide. Following that report, Chambers was transferred to another 
school. Her duties upon transfer, however, were the same as her 
duties before transfer and did not involve assisting handicapped 
students. 
The test for strength and mobility which the District 
required of Chambers and other unit employees is arguably not 
mandatorily negotiable only if the test is to determine the 
employee's ability to perform duties which either are required or 
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can be required of the position held by the employee.-7 The 
District assumes that it has the right unilaterally to require 
health aide-typists to assist with the lifting and movement of 
handicapped students, and because it has that right, it may also 
unilaterally subject employees to medical tests to determine if 
they have the physical ability to perform those tasks. The 
record establishes conclusively, however, that the health aide-
typist is a position distinct from a health aide-7 and that the 
health aide-typists have never, in fact, assisted with the 
physical needs of handicapped students. 
The District also claims that assisting handicapped students 
with their physical needs are tasks which can be required of 
health aide-typists even if those tasks have not actually been 
performed by them. The record, however, does not support that 
argument either. The civil service job description for the 
health aide-typist does not contain anything even suggesting that 
a health aide-typist is required to, for example, help lift 
handicapped students from a wheelchair. The position description 
reflects a position which is primarily clerical with a secondary 
and minor first aid component. Although the job description 
specifically requires a "physical condition commensurate with the 
^State of New York, 27 PERB [^3018 (1994) ; Citv of White Plains. 
18 PERB H3074 (1985). 
2/Whether the duties of a health aide include assisting with the 
physical needs of a handicapped student and whether such duties 
are consistent with the job description of a health aide are 
issues which are not material to the disposition of this charge. 
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demands of the position", the strength tests administered were 
simply not for duties within the demands of the position of a 
health aide-typist, either as described or as rendered. Without 
regard to any other rationale which might have rendered the 
District's test, at least as implemented, mandatorily 
negotiable,—7 the District clearly may not subject an employee 
unilaterally to a physical examination or strength test in 
conjunction with duties that have not in fact been performed by 
the employees and cannot be assigned unilaterally to them. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the District's exceptions are dismissed. Our 
affirmance makes it unnecessary and inappropriate to consider 
CSEA's cross-exception. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District immediately: 
1. Cease subjecting health aide-typists to strength tests 
or physical examinations regarding duties involving 
assisting handicapped students with their physical 
needs. 
2. Rescind the transfer orders of any health aide-typist 
which were based on a physical examination or strength 
test conducted since August 1993, and return those 
employees to their former assignments. 
—
/See, e.g.f County of Nassau, 27 PERB 13054 (1994) (appeal 
pending). 
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Remove any reports related to such physical 
examinations or strength tests from any employment or 
personnel files kept or maintained by the District or 
its agents. 
Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to CSEA unit employees. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella/G hairperson 
ralter__L(w Eisenberg, Member ~T 
mertz, Member y 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Dutchess Educational Local 867, Wappingers Central School District that the Wappingers Central School District 
will immediately: 
1. Stop subjecting health aide-typists to strength tests or physical examinations regarding duties involving 
assisting handicapped students with their physical needs. 
2. Rescind the transfer orders of any health aide-typist which were based on a physical examination or strength 
test conducted since August 1993, and return those employees to their former assignments. 
3. Remove any reports related to such physical examinations or strength tests from any employment or 
personnel files kept or maintained by the District or its agents. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ASSOCIATION OF SURROGATES AND SUPREME 
COURT REPORTERS WITHIN THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 
Charging- -P-a-r-ty-7-
-and- CASE NO. U-13412 
STATE OF NEW YORK-UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. (K. JANE FANKHANEL and EVAN K. 
KORNRICH of counsel), for Charging Party 
NORMA MEACHAM, ESQ., DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES (SUSAN G. 
WHITELEY and LEONARD R. KERSHAW of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State 
of New York-Unified Court System (UCS) and the Association 
of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters Within the City of 
New York (Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ). The Association alleges in its charge that UCS 
violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed its practice 
and discontinued the terms of two separate, expired agreements 
pertaining to the rate of and conditions under which UCS pays for 
transcripts produced and delivered by court reporters in the 
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Association's unit.-7 
After several days of hearing, the ALJ held that UCS 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act in the following respects: 
1. ending its practice of paying double ($2.75) 
the base rate ($1,375) for daily and 
expedited transcripts when only the court 
orders a copy; 
2. requiring expedited copy to be supplied 
within three business days instead of within 
three days for each day of testimony to 
qualify for any payment by UCS.-7 
The ALJ also held that UCS discontinued the terms of an expired 
1983 Page Rate Agreement (PRA) in violation of §209-a.l(e) of the 
Act when it ceased paying the base rate of $1,375 for regular 
copy-7 produced and delivered before the close of the case. 
As relevant to the Association's exceptions, the ALJ 
dismissed allegations pertaining to indeterminate sentencing 
-
7The Association represents approximately 33 0 court reporters 
working in Supreme Court in New York City. There are similar 
charges against UCS filed by other unions representing court 
reporters working elsewhere within UCS. The ALJ issued separate 
decisions because there are some different issues and facts in 
each case. To avoid confusion, we have not consolidated the 
cases on appeal. Decisions involving other affected unions were 
issued at our January 1995 meeting. 
-
7Under UCS's abolished practice in this respect, a reporter 
would have, for example, six days in which to produce and deliver 
a transcript for payment after a two-day hearing. 
-
7Regular copy for purposes of the ALJ's decision and order in 
this case is that which is produced and delivered outside of the 
time frames defining daily or expedited copy. 
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transcripts.-1 The ALJ held that an agreement, memorialized by 
letter dated March 9, 1979, under which UCS ordered three copies 
of indeterminate sentencing transcripts, paying the prevailing 
rate for the first copy and one-half that rate for the second and 
third copies, was not an agreement for purposes of §209-a.l(e) of 
the Act. The ALJ dismissed the §2 09-a.l(d) allegation based on 
UCS' decision to stop purchasing a second and third copy of the 
indeterminate sentencing transcripts on the ground that the 
decision in that respect, despite its effect on the reporter's 
compensation,-7 was not mandatorily negotiable because the 
number of transcripts ordered related primarily to UCS' mission 
and level of service. The Association excepts to the ALJ's 
dismissal of each of these allegations. 
UCS defends its stoppage of premium payments for daily and 
expedited copy on the ground that the expired 1983 PRA 
establishes a base rate of $1,375 per page for all transcripts 
and that it could revert to the terms of that agreement 
notwithstanding any inconsistent practice. It defends its 
cessation of payments for any transcripts produced and delivered 
in excess of three working days of the recording on the ground 
-/Criminal Procedure Law §380.70 requires that a certified copy 
of the minutes of the sentencing proceeding be delivered within 
3 0 days to the person in charge of the institution to which the 
defendant has been sentenced and delivered. The agreement in 
issue was reached in response to enactment of this legislation. 
-/By ordering only one copy of indeterminate sentencing 
transcripts, UCS effectively cut the reporters' pay for those 
transcripts in half. 
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that such transcripts constitute "regular" copy within the 
meaning of Judiciary Law §299 as interpreted in Alweis v. 
Evans-7 and that such regular copy must be provided to a judge 
free of charge. 
UCS' defenses to the violations of the Act found by the 
ALJ in this case were considered and rejected by us in a decision 
issued at our January 1995 meeting on a substantially similar 
charge filed against UCS by District Council 37 (U-13410) J-1 We 
incorporate our decision in U-13410 herein and, for the reasons 
fully set forth in that decision, reject UCS7 defenses to the 
violations of the Act found by the ALJ in this case. 
The Association's exceptions, however, were not considered 
in U-13410. Those exceptions pertain to indeterminate sentencing 
transcripts and center on the nature of a 1979 agreement 
pertaining thereto. The 1979 agreement in issue was entered into 
by Lester Kane, then the Association's president, and David 
Barnes, then the Deputy Administrative Director for New York City 
Courts. That agreement was implemented consistently by UCS until 
early 1992, when it began ordering only one copy of indeterminate 
sentencing transcripts instead of the agreed-upon three copies. 
In dismissing the §209-a.l(e) allegation, the ALJ held that 
the 1979 agreement was not an agreement within the meaning of 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act because it did not contain a specified 
^69 N.Y.2d 199 (1987). 
Z / S t a t e of New York-Unified Court System, 28 PERB ^[3003 (1995) . 
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period and was not entered into by UCS' chief executive officer. 
The ALJ rested his determination on the definition of an 
agreement in §201.12 of the Act which states as follows: 
The term "agreement" means the result of the exchange 
of mutual promises between the chief executive officer 
of a public employer and an employee organization which 
becomes—a—binding— contract^—for—the period—s-e-t—f-o-r-th 
therein, except as to any provisions therein which 
require approval by a legislative body, and as to those 
provisions, shall become binding when the appropriate 
legislative body gives its approval. 
We reverse the ALJ's decision finding no violation of 
§209-a.1(e) of the Act with respect to compensation for 
indeterminate sentencing transcripts because the 1979 agreement 
qualifies as an expired agreement for purposes of 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
An agreement, if reduced to or memorialized by a writing,-'' 
need not contain an express duration clause for it to be an 
agreement within the meaning of §§201.12 and 209-a.l(e) of the 
Act. The relevant language in §201.12 merely means that if there 
is a duration clause in the document, the contract is binding for 
that stated period. Where no specific duration is stated in a 
collective bargaining agreement, a reasonable duration will be 
implied as a matter of law.-7 
-'An agreement need not be in writing to be valid and enforceable 
for any purpose under the Act. Indeed, §204.3 of the Act 
entitles a party to a written agreement only on demand. 
^Bd. of Educ. of Brookhaven-Comsewoque Union Free Sch. Dist. v. 
Port Jefferson Station Teachers Ass'n, 88 Misc.2d 27, 10 PERB 
^7502 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1976) (citing cases and authority); 
Wvandanch Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Wyandanch Teachers Ass'n, 
9 PERB ^7534 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1976). 
Board - U-13412 -6 
A cause of action under §209-a.l(e) requires also, however, 
that the agreement be expired. If the 1979 agreement was still 
in effect when the UCS discontinued its terms, no cause of action 
would exist under §209-a.l(e). When this case first came before 
us for discussion, we decided to invite the parties to file an 
additional brief on the question of whether the 1979 agreement 
should be found to be expired within the meaning of §2 09-a.l(e) 
if an agreement within the meaning of the Act was found to exist 
at all. In response to that request, the Association argues that 
the agreement could be considered expired at different dates 
before its charge was filed. UCS did not address the issue of 
expiration, reiterating its argument that the 1979 agreement is 
not an agreement within the meaning of the Act. UCS made no 
arguments in opposition to the Association's contention that the 
agreement is expired for purposes of §209-a.l(e). 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we hold that the 1979 agreement must be considered 
expired for purposes of §209-a.l(e). It suffices for purposes of 
§2 09-a.l(e) that an agreement be expired when the employer fails 
or refuses to continue the terms of the expired agreement. It is 
not, therefore, necessary to fix a precise expiration date for 
the 1979 agreement. We believe that the most logical expiration 
date of that agreement is July 1987 when the PRA expired. The 
transcript payment methodology and rate originally agreed upon in 
the 1979 agreement changed upon negotiation of the PRA to reflect 
the PRA methodology and rate. The 1979 agreement specified 
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payment at the rate of $.30 per folio for the first copy and $.15 
per folio for the second and third copies consistent with the 
then prevailing payment methodology and rate. The 1983 PRA 
substituted a base rate per page at rates which increased over 
the duration of the PRA.. UCS continued to order three copies of 
indeterminate sentencing transcripts after negotiation of the 
PRA, paying for those transcripts at the rates required by the 
PRA. This evidences that the parties intended to link the terms 
of the two agreements in certain significant respects. 
Alternatively, the 1979 agreement could be considered to have 
expired when, in negotiations for a successor to the PRA, the 
State proposed to discontinue payments for all transcripts. This 
demand manifested UCS7 clear intent not to automatically renew 
the 1979 agreement, a conclusion which might otherwise have been 
drawn from its continuing adherence to an agreement without 
explicit duration. On either of these theories, there is an 
expired agreement within the meaning of §2 09-a.l(e) of the Act. 
The second ground for the ALJ7s dismissal of the §209-a.l(e) 
charge was that the 1979 PRA had not been entered into by UCS' 
chief executive officer. It is immaterial, however, that the 
1979 agreement was not negotiated personally by UCS7 chief 
executive officer.—7 A chief executive officer of a public 
employer clearly may, and often does, negotiate through agents. 
The chief executive officer of UCS is specifically empowered to 
—
xJudiciary Law, §212(1) (e) makes the Chief Administrator of the 
Courts UCS7 chief executive officer for purposes of the Act. 
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! delegate functions, powers and duties to any deputy or 
assistant.—7 UCS' uninterrupted adherence to the 1979 agreement 
for approximately thirteen years, even after negotiation and 
expiration of the 1983 PRA, establishes that Barnes either had 
actual or apparent authority to initially enter into that 
agreement on behalf of UCS7 chief executive officer—7 or that 
his actions were subsequently ratified by UCS. The payments UCS 
made pursuant to the 1979 agreement continued for so long a 
period of time, even after negotiation of the 1983 PRA, that it 
was incumbent upon UCS to establish that its responsible agents 
lacked actual or imputed knowledge of that agreement and 
disavowed the payments made thereunder. The record does not 
establish that Barnes lacked any authority to enter into the 1979 
agreement, that responsible agents of UCS were unaware of that 
agreement, or that UCS ever disavowed it until the action in 1992 
giving rise to this charge. Quite the contrary, having 
^Judiciary Law, §212(l)(s). Hudson Valley Dist. Council of 
Carpenters v. State of New York, 152 A.D.2d 105, 23 PERB f7514 
(3d Dep't 1989) (hereafter Hudson Valley) is not to the contrary 
and affords UCS no defense in this case. The Court in Hudson 
Valley held only that on the facts of that case, a state agency 
commissioner and facility superintendents were not acting as the 
Governor's agents for purposes of negotiating an agreement 
regarding carpentry at certain facilities. Among other factors 
influencing the Court in Hudson Valley, the agency commissioner 
had specifically and promptly disavowed the existence of any 
agreement and the power of the facility superintendents to enter 
into any agreements. Hudson Valley does not support or require a 
conclusion that the Chief Administrator of the Courts and UCS' 
Director of Labor Relations are the only two persons empowered to 
enter into agreements with the representatives of UCS' employees. 
—
7See Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist. , 6 PERB [^3 014 (1973) . 
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negotiated the 1983 PRA through its designated labor relations 
negotiator, UCS necessarily ratified outstanding agreements and 
practices with respect to payments for other types of 
transcripts. UCS7 proposals submitted in the negotiations for a 
successor to the 1983 PRA, most particularly the December 1989 
proposal to terminate all transcript payments, further confirm 
UCS' awareness of transcript payments in relevant part. 
UCS also argues that §209-a.l(e) of the Act cannot require 
the continued ordering of and payment for a second and third copy 
of an indeterminate sentencing transcript because there is no 
evidence that the 1979 agreement has been legislatively approved. 
We are not certain whether UCS contends that legislative approval 
of transcript payments after 1992 is required or whether 
legislative approval was required of the 1979 agreement when it 
was first entered. Neither argument, however, is persuasive. 
A government's obligations under §209-a.l(e) of the Act are 
not dependent upon the actions or inactions of its legislative 
body. Section 209-a.l(e) of the Act attaches upon expiration of 
an agreement and requires the continuation of all terms of that 
expired agreement until a successor agreement is negotiated, 
whether or not the legislative body elects to "approve" the post-
expiration continuation of those terms. Section 209-a.l(e) 
imposes affirmative obligations upon a government which must be 
honored so long as its conditions are satisfied, irrespective of 
the actions or inactions of the government's legislative body. 
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UCS' argument in this respect is no more compelling if it is 
suggesting that §209-a.l(e) cannot serve to continue the terms of 
the 1979 agreement on and after 1992 because it had not been 
legislatively approved on negotiation or during its duration. In 
relevant context, legislative approval is required only as to 
those terms of an agreement requiring "additional funds" for 
implementation.—7 Payments under the 1979 contract were in 
fact made by UCS for years, payments which could not have been 
made without an appropriation. Therefore, the 1979 agreement 
either carried with it the funds necessary for its 
implementation, in which case legislative approval was not 
required, or such additional funds as were necessary for its 
implementation were appropriated, in which case legislative 
approval was granted. In either circumstance, the March 1979 
agreement was binding. 
UCS argues lastly that the 1983 PRA extinguished the 1979 
agreement. We held in U-13410, incorporated by reference herein, 
however, that the 1983 PRA applies by its terms only to regular 
copy and not to other forms of copy such as the indeterminate 
sentencing transcripts in issue in this case. Moreover, as noted 
in the discussion of the expiration of the 1979 agreement, it 
appears that the parties intended to have the 1979 agreement 
applied according to the rates set by the PRA and did, in fact, 
do so. This intent and practice is not consistent with a 
-^
7Act §2 04-a.l. 
Board - U-13412 -11 
conclusion that the parties intended to abolish the 1979 
transcript agreement when they negotiated the 198 3 PRA. Again, 
UCS' demands in negotiations for a successor to the PRA make 
manifest that even UCS did not understand the 19 8 3 PRA to have 
extinguished payments for all but regular copy. 
Having found an agreement within the meaning of both §201.12 
and §2 09-a.l(e) of the Act, we do not consider the Association's 
equitable estoppel argument. Similarly, in view of our finding 
that UCS is required to order and pay for three copies of 
indeterminate sentencing transcripts pursuant to the expired 1979 
agreement, we do not reach the §2 09-a.l(d) allegation, which is 
also based on UCS' decision to order only one copy of such 
transcripts. Therefore, we do not consider the Association's 
exception directed to the ALJ's dismissal of the §2 09-a.l(d) 
allegation pertaining to indeterminate sentencing transcripts. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
that UCS: 
1. Reinstate its practice of paying reporters double the 
base rate of $1,375 per page for the production of daily or 
expedited copy when only the court orders the transcript and 
reinstate its practice of paying the base rate of $1,375 per page 
for transcripts produced in other than a daily or expedited time 
frame, but before the close of a case. 
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2. Rescind and cease implementation of any work rules or 
directives requiring expedited transcripts be supplied within 
three business days of the date of order to qualify for payment. 
3. Make any unit employees who produced and delivered daily 
transcripts by the next day and were not paid $2.75 per page when 
ordered only by the court whole for any loss of pay, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
4. Make any unit employees who produced and delivered 
expedited transcripts within three days for each day of testimony 
and were not paid $2.75 per page when ordered only by the court 
whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
5. Make any unit employees who produced and delivered 
transcripts in other than a daily or expedited time frame, but 
before the close of a case, and were not paid $1,375 per page 
whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
6. Continue to order three copies of indeterminate 
sentencing transcripts, paying the prevailing base rate for the 
first copy and one-half that rate for the second and the third 
copy. 
7. Pay to any unit employee who produced and delivered one 
copy of an indeterminate sentencing transcript the difference 
between the payment actually made by UCS to the employee and what 
would have been paid by UCS to the employee had UCS ordered and 
paid for a second and third copy pursuant to the 19 79 agreement 
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pertaining to indeterminate sentencing transcripts, with interest 
at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
8. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used by UCS to post notices of information to 
Association unit employees. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees of the State of New York-Unified Court System (UCS) represented by the Association 
of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters Within the City of New York that UCS will: 
1. Reinstate its practice of paying reporters double the base rate of $1,375 per page for the production of daily 
or expedited copy when only the court orders the transcript and reinstate its practice of paying the base rate of $1,375 
per page for transcripts produced in other than a daily or expedited time frame, but before the close of a case. 
2. Rescind and cease implementation of any work rules or directives requiring expedited transcripts be supplied 
within three business days of the date of order to qualify for payment. 
3. Make any unit employees who produced and delivered daily transcripts by the next day and were not paid 
$2.75 per page when ordered only by the court whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
4. Make any unit employees who produced and delivered expedited transcripts within three days for each day 
of testimony and were not paid $2.75 per page when ordered only by the court whole for any loss of pay, with interest 
at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
5. Make any unit employees who produced and delivered transcripts in other than a daily or expedited time 
frame, but before the close of a case, and were not paid $1,375 per page whole for any loss of pay, with interest at the 
currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
6. Continue to order three copies of indeterminate sentencing transcripts, paying the prevailing base rate for 
the first copy and one-half that rate for the second and the third copy. 
7. Pay to any unit employees who produced and delivered one copy of an indeterminate sentencing transcript 
the difference between the payment actually made by UCS to the employee and what would have been paid by UCS to 
the employee had UCS ordered and paid for a second and third copy pursuant to the 1979 agreement pertaining to 
indeterminate sentencing transcripts, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
D . . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 100 0, APSCME, APL-CIO, CAPITAL 
REGION JUDICIARY LOCAL #694, 
Charging—Party7 
-and- CASE NO. U-14708 
STATE OP NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN S. DYMOND of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
NORMA MEACHAM, ESQ., DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES (SUSAN G. 
WHITELEY and LEONARD R. KERSHAW of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The State of New York - Unified Court System (UCS) has filed 
exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
finding that it had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it changed a full-time principal 
office assistant position into two part-time principal office 
assistant positions and refused demands from the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Capital 
Region Judiciary Local #694 (CSEA) to negotiate the change. In 
reaching her decision, the ALT rejected UCS7 several defenses, 
including waiver, past practice, reclassification of positions 
and managerial prerogative. 
"^  
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UCS employs approximately 2,062 nonjudicial employees in the 
State Judiciary Unit represented by CSEA. Some of these 
employees are assigned to the Court of Claims, which is located 
in the Justice Building in Albany. Prior to August 1993, the 
Court of Claims was accessed through several different entries. 
As a result of complaints about missing property and loud and 
inappropriate behavior by some visitors to the Court, UCS 
determined to limit access to the Court to one entrance and to 
move the receptionist/switchboard operator into that area. New 
locks and a "swipe card" security system were installed. UCS 
then decided that it was necessary to have staff escort visitors 
and operate the swipe card system. Therefore, it abolished a 
vacant principal office assistant position, grade JG-12, in its 
purchasing unit and created two part-time principal office 
assistant positions, also grade JG-12, to be assigned to the 
receptionist/switchboard operator area.^ Not utilizing the 
promotion eligible list for the competitive class position of 
principal office assistant, UCS posted, on May 26, 1993, an 
employment opportunity announcement for two part-time principal 
office assistant positions. CSEA thereafter made two demands to 
negotiate UCS7 action, both of which were refused by UCS. Two 
employees were hired to fill the positions, effective August 2 
-'•'Pursuant to Chief Administrative Judge Evans' administrative 
order of July 7, 198 0, part-time positions share the same title 
standard with full-time positions, but full-time positions are in 
the competitive class of the Civil Service and part-time titles 
are in the noncompetitive class. 
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and 9, 1993, respectively. Both positions are in the unit 
represented by CSEA.-7 The two part-time principal office 
assistants work alternate weeks of thirty-five hours per week, 
which is the equivalent of one full-time principal office 
assistant. They are paid one-half the salary of a full-time 
principal office assistant and their benefits are pro-rated 
accordingly. The parties stipulated that although the duties of 
the two part-time principal office assistants assigned to the 
reception/switchboard area are different from the duties 
performed by the full-time principal office assistant in the 
purchasing unit, they fall within the range of duties contained 
in the job description for the position. 
The parties' 1991-95 collective bargaining agreement 
contains a management rights clause, Article 5, which states: 
Except as expressly limited by other provisions of this 
Agreement, all of the authority, rights and 
responsibilities possessed by the State are retained by 
it, including but not limited to, the right to 
determine the mission, purpose, objectives and policies 
of the State; to determine the facilities, methods, 
means and number of personnel required for the conduct 
of State Judiciary programs; to administer the Merit 
System, including the examination, selection, 
recruitment, hiring, appraisal, training, retention, 
promotion, assignment or transfer of employees pursuant 
to law; to direct, deploy, and utilize the work force; 
to establish specifications for each class of positions 
and to classify or reclassify and to allocate or 
-
7The unit represented by CSEA includes both full-time and part-
time employees, including ten full-time principal office 
assistants and four part-time principal office assistants. Two 
of the part-time employees are those who are in issue here. The 
other two participate in job sharing of one position pursuant to 
a job share policy implemented by UCS in 1990, with CSEA's 
agreement. 
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reallocate new or existing positions in accordance with 
law and the provisions of this Agreement. 
The parties further stipulated that "[m]anagement states 
that its reason for deciding that such duties should be shared by 
two part-time employees was to enable them to remain vigilant and 
observant-todetect-problems-andrespond^promptly andprudently". 
The ALJ found that, by agreement to the language in the 
management rights clause, CSEA had not waived its right to 
negotiate the abolition of the full-time position and the 
creation of the two part-time positions. She further found that 
UCS' action was not a reclassification and was not permitted by 
the parties7 past practice. She also rejected UCS' argument that 
the subject nature of its decision was not mandatorily negotiable 
as being mission-related. 
UCS excepts to each of the ALT's findings; CSEA supports the 
ALJ's decision. Having reviewed the record and considered the 
parties7 arguments, we affirm the ALJ. 
UCS argues in its exceptions that its action in abolishing 
the full-time principal office assistant position and creating 
two part-time office assistant positions was a reclassification, 
which it is not required to negotiate.-7 The ALJ determined 
that no new job title had been created because the Chief 
Administrative Judge's 1990 administrative order had already 
created part-time titles for all full-time titles in the unit. 
-
7New York State Court Employees Ass'n, 12 PERB ^3075 (1979). 
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She further found that no classification, as it is statutorily 
defined, had taken place as the UCS had not undertaken 
a grouping together, under common and descriptive 
titles, of positions that are substantially similar in 
the essential character and scope of their duties and 
responsibilities and in the qualifications therefor.-7 
Although—the parties stipulated that—the—U€S—"-recia-ss-i-f-i-ed-"—the 
vacant, full-time, competitive class position of principal office 
assistant, JG-12, which was assigned to the purchasing unit, to 
principal office assistant, JG-12 (part-time) in the non-
competitive area and assigned it to the new reception/switchboard 
area, they further stipulated that the job description was not 
changed and that the duties of the part-time principal office 
assistants are included in the job description utilized for both 
the full-time and part-time positions.-7 In determining the 
negotiability of an employer's personnel actions, we have held: 
Classification is clearly a personnel management 
tool which facilitates the ascertainment of staffing 
needs within particular areas of an employer's 
operation. It is closely allied to the setting of job 
qualifications, the promulgation of job descriptions 
characterizing employees' essential duties and 
functions and the creation of a table of organization -
all of which we have previously held to constitute 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiations. (footnote 
omitted) Moreover, classification as such does not 
^Civil Service Law §2.11. 
-
/UCS argues that since the parties stipulated that UCS had 
"reclassified" the at-issue principal office assistant position 
from full-time to part-time, the ALJ could not find otherwise. 
It is clear, however, that the parties stipulated not that the 
action was a reclassification, but that that was what UCS called 
it. 
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establish, and does not have a direct impact upon, 
terms and conditions of employment.-'' 
Absent the creation of a new title, a new job description or new 
qualifications, the abolition of the full-time principal office 
assistant position and the creation of two part-time principal 
office assistant positions cannot be viewed as a 
reclassification. Additionally, as the ALJ found, the primary 
impact of UCS' action here is on employees' terms and conditions 
of employment, such as hours of work. 
UCS also argues that it required two part-time employees to 
ensure vigilant security in the switchboard/reception area and 
that its decision concerning what services to provide and the 
staffing required to provide it are managerial decisions which 
need not be negotiated. While level of service-7 and staffing-7 
are nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, "the selection of a 
specific means of accomplishing that prerogative affects terms 
and conditions of employment and is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations".-7 Certainly, several different methods of 
staffing could provide the "vigilance" sought by UCS, assuming 
-'New York State Court Employees Ass'n, supra, at 3140-41. 
Z/See, e.g., City Sch. Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB 
53060 (1971). 
-
7See, e.g.r City of Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 
21 PERB 53022 (1988). 
g/Starpoint Cent. Sch. Dist., 23 PERB 53012, at 3027 (1990). 
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for the sake of this decision that vigilance beyond that normally 
required of UCS employees was necessary.—x 
Therefore, unless there is merit to UCS' remaining defenses, 
UCS violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it unilaterally 
abolished the full-time principal office assistant position and 
created two part-time principal office assistant positions and 
refused to negotiate its decision with CSEA. 
UCS argues that CSEA has waived its right to negotiate by 
virtue of the language of the management rights clause giving it 
the right to reclassify existing positions and to recruit, 
select, hire, and assign employees pursuant to law. The rights 
UCS points to are rights it possesses notwithstanding the 
language of the management rights clause.—' Indeed, the clause 
specifies that UCS merely retains "all the authority, rights, and 
responsibilities possessed by" it, in accordance with law. The 
clause as written is merely a retention of existing rights; no 
additional rights were acquired by it. UCS7 existing rights do 
not include the right to unilaterally "substitute part-time 
—
7We reject UCS' argument raised in its exceptions that since 
CSEA did not demand negotiations specifically related to the 
allocation of the hours of work of the former full-time principal 
office assistant, the charge should be dismissed. We have 
previously held, however, that an employer's unilateral action 
with respect to a mandatory subject of negotiations gives rise, 
without more, to an improper practice charge. A demand by the 
union to negotiate that which has been improperly unilaterally 
implemented is not required. 
—
7The clause sets forth, inter alia, UCS' right to determine its 
"mission, purpose, objectives and policies", the administration 
of the Merit System and the allocation and reallocation of 
positions. 
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employees for full-time employees11.—/ General management 
rights clauses do not give rise to a waiver of the right to 
negotiate.—7 Waiver must be clear, unmistakable and 
unambiguous.—'' This clause cannot be read as a clear and 
explicit waiver of CSEA's right to negotiate the relevant 
decision. 
Finally, UCS argues that because it has always utilized 
part-time employees to deliver its service, CSEA had agreed that 
it could utilize part-time employees as it saw fit. However, 
there is no evidence that UCS' utilization of part-time employees 
has also consistently involved the substitution of part-time 
positions for full-time positions or that CSEA has ever 
acquiesced in such an action by UCS.—' 
Based on the above, we find that UCS violated the Act when 
it unilaterally abolished a full-time principal office assistant 
position and replaced it with two part-time principal office 
assistant positions. 
^County of Broome, 22 PERB 53019, at 3052 (1989). 
^
7CSEA v. Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 57011 (3d Dep't 1982). 
—'That there are two part-time principal office assistants in the 
unit is not dispositive of this issue. Their positions were 
created as part of a job share arrangement agreed to by CSEA. 
The action was initiated by the two employees, not unilaterally 
imposed by UCS and actually keeps the single item intact, 
compared to two different part-time positions. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that UCS restore the principal 
office assistant position to full-time status as it existed prior 
to May 26, 1993, and negotiate with CSEA regarding any 
substitution of part-time positions for that full-time position. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UCS sign and post the attached 
notice at all locations ordinarily used by it to post written 
communications to unit employees. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
fexA^j. jf. kyrj^ln 
Pauline R. Kmse l l a , Chairperson 
Walter^L.Eisenberg, Member / 
Eric J /Schmer t z , Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York-Unified Court System (UCS) represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Capital Region Judiciary Local #694 (CSEA) that UCS will 
restore the principal office assistant position to full-time status as it existed prior to May 26, 1993, and negotiate 
with CSEA regarding any substitution of part-time positions for that full-time position. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
STATE OF NEW YORK-UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
2J- 3/22/95 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ODESSA-MONTOUR TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14544 
ODESSA-MONTOUR CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
SAYLES, EVANS, BRAYTON, PALMER & TIFFT (CYNTHIA S. 
HUTCHINSON and JAMES P. YOUNG of counsel), for Respondent 
> BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Odessa-Montour Central School District (District) 
excepts to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (AKT) 
finding that it violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally subcontracted its 
school bus services, thereby eliminating all of the positions in 
the unit represented by the Odessa-Montour Transportation 
Association (Association). The Association excepts to the scope 
of the remedy ordered by the ALJ, but otherwise supports his 
decision. 
The charge alleges a violation of §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the 
Act. The AKT dismissed the alleged violation of §2 09-a.l(a) of 
1 the Act for lack of proof and that aspect of the charge is not 
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before us. He also initially dismissed for lack of proof the 
allegation that the District had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act 
by refusing a request to continue contract negotiations.-7 The 
unilateral subcontracting allegation was dismissed on the ground 
that the charge was limited to actions taken by the District's 
Board of Education and that the duty to negotiate could not be 
violated by the action of a legislative body. We reversed the 
ALJ's dismissal of the subcontracting allegation, determining 
that the charge had pled an action by the District's chief 
executive officer, the Superintendent of Schools, which was 
sufficient as a matter of law to make out a prima facie claim of 
a §209-a.l(d) violation. We remanded the case to the ALJ for 
further findings consistent with our decision.-7 
On remand, the ALJ held that the Association had not agreed 
to the subcontracting of the District's busing operation and had 
not waived, by silence or otherwise, its right to negotiate the 
decision to subcontract. The ALJ ordered the District to cease 
and desist from utilizing nonunit personnel to perform unit work, 
to restore its busing and maintenance services and to make unit 
employees whole for any wages lost because of the subcontracting. 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, asking us to 
reconsider our earlier finding that the Association had pled a 
prima facie violation of §209-a.l(d). It also argues that the 
1727 PERB 54511 (1994) . 
2727 PERB «|[3050 (1994) . 
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ALT erred in finding that the District had refused to negotiate 
its decision to subcontract with the Association and in finding 
that the Association had not waived its right to negotiate that 
decision. 
The Association excepts only to the remedy, arguing that the 
ALJ erred in not ordering the District to make unit members whole 
for any loss in benefits that resulted from the District's 
action. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision, with modifications of 
the remedy. 
The Association represented a unit consisting of the school 
bus drivers and mechanics employed by the District.-7 The 
parties had a collective bargaining agreement which expired on 
July 1, 1991. Their negotiations for a successor agreement had 
resulted in a memorandum of agreement, but, when the District's 
Board of Education failed to accept the proposed three-year 
agreement in October 1992, no new negotiations were scheduled for 
a time.-7 Tilden and the Association president, Charles Vary, 
were thereafter notified by an October 15, 1992 letter from James 
-''The District conceded that the at-issue work had always been 
exclusively performed by employees represented by the 
Association. 
-
7William Stratton, the District's chief negotiator, notified 
Robert Tilden, chief negotiator for the Association, on 
October 13, 1993, that the agreement had not been approved by the 
District and noted that "my direction from the District is to 
continue to reach an acceptable agreement between the parties." 
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Young, the District's attorney, that because of economic 
concerns, the District was exploring the option of contracting 
out its transportation service to a private company. Young 
noted: 
Decisions of the Public Employment Relations Board 
require—amunicipality—to—o-f-f-e-r—teo negotiate the 
decision to contract out services previously performed 
by employees, and, if the decision is reached to 
contract out the services, the employer is required to 
negotiate the impact. The District has instructed me 
to offer to meet with you for the purpose of 
negotiating the decision to contract out 
transportation. 
Vary responded by letter dated October 19, 1992, stating that the 
Association "will be unable to secure advice regarding impact 
negotiations in time to meet with you on the dates you have 
proposed" and suggesting new dates. The parties met on 
November 10, 1992, and agreed that after the District advertised 
for bids from contractors, the resulting bid information would be 
given to the Association to enable it to formulate a 
counterproposal. Young confirmed in a November 11 letter to 
Tilden and Vary that procedures had been agreed to in "regard to 
the negotiations for the decision and the impact of 
subcontracting". 
Meanwhile, on December 1, 1992, the parties resumed their 
negotiations for a successor to the collective bargaining 
agreement which had expired on June 30, 1991. The Association 
was represented in these negotiations by Tilden and Vary, and the 
District was represented not by Young, but by Stratton. The 
Association submitted a proposal for the successor agreement, the 
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District countered, and the Association then conceded on a number 
of issues, including a reduction in the salary increases it 
sought over the proposed four-year contract. Stratton consulted 
with Donald Gooley, the Superintendent of Schools, during the 
December 1 negotiating session about the District's response to 
the Association's proposals, although Gooley was not present at 
the session. 
Young, Vary and Tilden corresponded throughout January 1993, 
with the Association proposing dates when it would be available 
to continue "impact negotiations" and Young inviting the 
Association to make a counterproposal regarding transportation. 
Young confirmed in a February 1, 1993 letter to the Association 
that the proposed bids indicated a large economic savings to the 
District and that if it should decide to subcontract, "we will 
have to negotiate the impact of that decision with you. I also 
invite you at this time to make proposals for that possibility 
also." Young further confirmed in a February 5, 1993 letter that 
"the District wishes to fulfill its Taylor Law obligations to 
your Association in regard to the decision and impact of contract 
busing and that the District wanted the Association to compare 
costs of transportation provided by unit employees with the 
proposed bids the District had received." 
Association representatives met with Young on February 17, 
1993. While the versions offered by the parties to the 
discussions at that meeting conflict, the ALJ determined that the 
record showed that the Association did not make a counterproposal 
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at that time regarding contract busing.-7 The Association 
thereafter advised the District that it would be meeting with its 
membership and would then be prepared to make a proposal 
regarding subcontracting. Young responded with a February 22, 
199 3 letter to Tilden. In it, he expressed his understanding 
that the Association desired to negotiate the impact of 
subcontracting and that if it had a proposal to make, it must be 
made by March 1, 1993. 
On February 25, Vary wrote to Young, informing him that the 
Association had a proposal for a severance package in response to 
the District's proposed subcontracting. The letter contained 
nine proposals related to the severance benefits sought by the 
Association if the District were to subcontract. On March 8, 
Young and Tilden met to discuss the Association's demands. Young 
told Tilden that the District's first offer would be its best 
offer, with the money declining from that point on. He offered 
the Association $1000 for each member, but made no other 
counterproposals relating to the Association's nine proposals. 
Tilden confirmed these discussions by a March 11 letter to Young. 
He noted that the Association still needed the information from 
the State Retirement System it had earlier requested, but that it 
-''Tilden testified that he told Young that the Association's 
counterproposal to subcontracting had been made to Stratton 
during negotiations for the successor agreement. Young testified 
that the Association representatives stated that it had no 
proposal to make regarding the decision to subcontract. 
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was available for further negotiations and was awaiting a 
counterproposal from the District. 
Throughout January and February 1993, the Association 
representatives and Stratton continued to meet and correspond 
regarding the negotiation of a successor agreement. Tilden wrote 
a letter to Willie Pittman, president of the District's Board of 
Education, and Gooley in February 1993, outlining the comparative 
costs and benefits of District-provided busing and contract 
busing based on the bids reviewed by Tilden. He pointed out that 
the District's savings with subcontracting would be minimal, even 
with the modified salary increases sought by the Association in 
its proposals for a successor agreement. Both Gooley and Pittman 
responded to Tilden with inquiries about the figures arrived at 
by the Association, disputing some and agreeing with others.-7 
Tilden answered their inquiries with more information about his 
calculations. Negotiations for the successor agreement were held 
again on March 10, with Stratton urging the Association to take a 
two-year agreement, with four percent raises in each year. 
Stratton told Tilden that if the District did not go for 
subcontracting, "the next two years were [the District's] 
problem.,,-/ Tilden confirmed the Association's proposal for an 
-
7In his March 4, 1993 letter to Tilden, Gooley pointed out that 
"[fjuture salaries and fringe for drivers would in all 
probability be higher with district busing based on Birnie Bus' 
recent bid. By proposing no increase in wages for 1993-94 and 
1994-95, the drivers may be agreeing to short-term pain for long-
term gain." 
-
/rIhe meaning of this remark is unexplained on the record. 
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agreement with those terms in a letter to Stratton dated the same 
day. 
However, on March 11, 1993, the District's Board of 
Education voted to abolish all busing and maintenance positions 
effective June 30, 1993, to accept a bid for transportation 
services from Birnie Transportation Services, Inc., and directed 
Young to prepare a contract for 1993-94 and 1994-95 with Birnie. 
Notwithstanding this vote, on March 15, Stratton met with Tilden 
to urge him to make an offer to the District for a four-year 
agreement with no salary increases, informing him that Gooley 
wanted that proposal to come from the Association, not the 
District. Tilden complied and made the proposal to Stratton 
around March 25. Tilden also sent the proposal to Robert Lieby, 
a member of the Board of Education. Stratton later confirmed 
with Tilden that he had discussed the demand with Gooley.-7 
On March 26, Young wrote to Tilden and Vary, responding to 
Tilden's March 10 letter and indicating that the District would 
like to meet and clarify all its contractual and statutory 
obligations to unit employees upon their layoff. The Association 
then filed this improper practice charge. 
-''After a meeting of the Board of Education on April 8, 1993, 
Lieby told Tilden to get the proposal for a four-year contract 
with no salary increases to Stratton. When Tilden told Lieby 
that Stratton already had the proposal, Lieby informed him that 
the Board of Education was under the impression that the proposal 
had not been discussed in the contract negotiations and that 
Stratton had not seen it. 
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DISCUSSION 
We decline to reconsider our earlier decision that the 
District, including its Superintendent of Schools, wholly adopted 
the action of the Board of Education on March 11, 1993, 
abolishing its bus driver and mechanic positions and accepting 
the bid for transportation services from Birnie. Therefore, as 
pleaded, the charge set forth a cognizable claim of a violation 
of §209-a.l(d) premised upon a unilateral subcontract. 
Turning directly to the merits of the allegation, the 
District's actions in this matter indicate that it misapprehends 
its rights and obligations under the Act relating to a decision 
to subcontract. In Saratoga Springs School District,-7 we held 
that "the replacement of unit employees of a public employer with 
employees of a contractor who do the same work under similar 
performance standards"—7 plainly comes under the meaning of the 
words "terms and conditions of employment" which cannot be 
unilaterally imposed. The District is incorrect in its view that 
its duty to negotiate the decision to subcontract hinges upon a 
demand to negotiate by the Association. "The District's 
unilateral subcontracting of Unit work is itself a per se 
rejection of the bargaining process and a refusal to bargain. No 
2/11 PERB H3037 (1978), aff/d. 68 A.D.2d 202, 12 PERB «[[7008 (3d 
Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 47 N.Y.2d 711, 12 PERB 
?[7012 (1979) . 
^
7Id.. at 3059 (1978). 
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demand to bargain is necessary in such circumstance. Il—/ With 
few exceptions, discussed infra, a public employer may not act 
unilaterally with respect to a mandatory subject of 
negotiations.—7 Therefore, unless there is merit to the 
District's defenses, it violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it 
unilaterally contracted out its school busing and maintenance 
operations. 
The District informed the Association that it was 
contemplating contracting out its busing operation and offered to 
negotiate with the Association in its October 15, 1992 letter to 
the Association. However, it was the District's position that 
unless the Association came up with a proposal which was at least 
as economically beneficial to the District as subcontracting, the 
District would be free to enter into contract busing. The 
District argues in its exceptions that because the Association 
did not make a counterproposal to subcontracting directly to 
Young during the course of his negotiations with Tilden and Vary, 
it waived its right to negotiate, in effect conceding that the 
District could act unilaterally.. 
^Germantown Cent. Sch. Dist. , 26 PERB J3003, at 3007 (1993), 
rev'd on other grounds, 205 A.D.2d 961, 27 PERB f7009 (3d Dep't 
1994) . 
^Citv of Poughkeepsie, 15 PERB ?[3045 (1982), aff'd, 95 A.D.2d 
101, 16 PERB 5(7021 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 60 N.Y.2d 859, 
16 PERB 57027 (1983). 
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The ALT characterized the District's argument in this regard 
as a "waiver by silence",—7 which he rejected. He found that 
the Association never by word or action waived its right to 
negotiate the subcontracting of the District's busing operation. 
We agree. 
A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right 
that must be clear, unmistakable and without ambiguity.—7 The 
Association, both by its words and actions, articulated its 
position to the District regarding the proposed subcontracting. 
With one exception, throughout negotiations the Association 
proposed to the District a four-year successor agreement. The 
existence of that proposal is completely inconsistent with the 
District's position that the Association never made a 
counterproposal regarding subcontracting and agreed to allow the 
District to subcontract. The Association proposed to continue 
using bargaining unit employees to provide busing and bus 
maintenance for the District. It modified salary and benefit 
—
7The District did not raise waiver as an affirmative defense in 
its answer. However, the ALJ decided that since the District's 
answer asserted that "the District never received a demand to 
negotiate the decision to contract out busing from the Odessa-
Montour Transportation Association" and because of the evidence 
the District introduced at the hearing, it had effectively raised 
the waiver defense. No exceptions are taken to this aspect of 
the ALJ's decision. 
^Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 
f7011 (3d Dep't), appeal of remand dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 775, 
15 PERB 17020 (1982), on remand sub, nom. State of New York 
(State Univ. of New York at Albany), 16 PERB 13050 (1983), aff'd 
sub nom. Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Newman, 61 N.Y.2d 
1001, 17 PERB 17007 (1984). 
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proposals at the urging of the District's negotiator, Stratton, 
to achieve that end. The Association communicated to Young, 
Stratton, Gooley and two Board of Education members its concerns 
and proposals about the District's proposed action. The 
District's bifurcation of the simultaneous negotiations on 
subcontracting and on the successor agreement caused confusion 
about the parties' positions, but in that circumstance the 
District certainly cannot assert that the Association had clearly 
and unambiguously waived its right to negotiate the decision to 
subcontract. 
The District asserts that because no subcontracting proposal 
was made to Young, the Association made no subcontracting 
proposal and the District was, therefore, free to act. This 
argument ignores the facts in this case. Gooley and Stratton 
were aware throughout the process that the Association had not 
acquiesced to the District's subcontracting plans and had, in 
fact, countered the subcontracting proposal with proposals of its 
own. 
As part of its waiver defense, the District asserts that the 
Association waived its right to negotiate the decision to 
subcontract because it chose only to negotiate the impact of the 
contracting out decision in its meetings with Young. The 
District described the scope of negotiations as both decisional 
and impact through the early communications and meetings between 
the Association and Young. The Association on two occasions 
referred to impact, noting first that it needed to get advice 
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about impact negotiations and later that it was available to 
continue to negotiate impact. Young thereafter began referring 
to the subcontracting negotiations as dealing with impact only 
and the District now seeks to limit the Association's rights to 
impact negotiations only. 
As noted above, the Association at the same time was engaged 
in making proposals to the District both with respect to the 
decision to subcontract and with respect to the impact of such a 
decision on the bargaining unit, including its nine severance 
demands. It is apparent that the Association misused the term 
"impact negotiations", which refers to bargaining only "about 
those mandatorily negotiable effects which are inevitably or 
necessarily caused by an employer's exercise of a managerial 
prerogative.11—'' Such a misuse of terminology, even among 
experienced practitioners, is not unusual. As we noted in County 
of Nassau (Nassau County Police Department) ,—' in correcting a 
mistaken understanding about the difference between impact and 
decisional bargaining: 
[I]mpact bargaining is actually a limited exception to 
an employer's duty to negotiate all terms and 
conditions of employment and to an employer's corollary 
bargaining duty to refrain from unilateral changes with 
respect to those mandatorily negotiable subjects. 
The Association's characterization of the negotiations with 
Young which were ongoing as "impact negotiations" does not 
relieve the District of its responsibility to negotiate the 
^County of Nassau (Nassau County Police Dep't), 27 PERB 53 054, 
at 3120 (1994) (appeal pending). 
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decision itself when it is otherwise clear that the Association 
was seeking to bargain and was, in fact, engaged in bargaining 
with other District representatives, alternatives to the 
District's intended course of action with respect to the 
subcontracting decision itself. . The District's chief executive 
officer, Gooley, was aware of the Association's position on both 
subcontracting and its impact as he was the recipient of reports 
on the status of negotiations from both Young and Stratton, as 
well as a number of communications directly from the Association. 
By negotiating with Stratton for a successor agreement and making 
a four-year, no increase offer, the Association clearly sought to 
negotiate continued performance of the busing and maintenance 
work by unit employees rather than by a private contractor as a 
cost effective measure. 
Finally, the District argues that it satisfied its duty to 
bargain by offering to negotiate its decision to subcontract and 
by, in fact, bargaining that decision with the Association. 
However, the District only negotiated the subcontracting decision 
up to the point when it decided to act unilaterally. The parties 
were not at impasse, the District had no compelling need to act 
when it did and it did not remain willing to negotiate the 
decision itself after it acted.—7 "A party does not satisfy 
its statutory duty to bargain by negotiating on a subject for a 
^Cohoes City Sch. Dist., 12 PERB f3113 (1979); Wappinqers Cent. 
Sch. Dist.. 5 PERB H3074 (1972) . 
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time and then taking action unilaterally and prematurely 
regarding that subject."—7 
We accordingly find that the District's decision to 
subcontract its school busing and bus maintenance services and 
its elimination of its bus drivers and bus mechanics violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act. As to the Association's exception to the 
ALJ's remedy, we hereby modify the ALJ's order by requiring the 
District to make whole unit employees for any benefits lost as a 
result of the District's decision to subcontract. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Forthwith restore to the bargaining unit represented by 
the Association the duties which were formerly and exclusively 
performed by the bargaining unit positions of school bus driver 
and school bus mechanic. 
2. Offer reinstatement under their prior terms and 
conditions of employment to those unit employees terminated as a 
result of the subcontracting of the District's busing and bus 
maintenance operation. 
2. Make unit employees whole for any wages and benefits 
lost as a result of such subcontracting, with interest to be paid 
at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
^Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist., 25 PERB f3083, at 3171 (1992), 
vacated on other grounds, 26 PERB f7011 (Sup. Ct., Albany County, 
1993), aff'd, 197 A.D.2d 276, 27 PERB J7005 (3d Dep't), motion 
for leave to appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 803, 27 PERB [^7012 (1994). 
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3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post notices of information to unit 
employees. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
YA\Ai- %X^4^-. Pauline R. tinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membfer 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Odessa-Montour Transportation Association that the Odessa-
Montour Central School District will: 
1. Forthwith restore to the bargaining unit represented by the Association the duties which were 
formerly and exclusively performed by the bargaining unit positions of school bus driver and 
school bus mechanic. 
2. Offer reinstatement under their prior terms and conditions of employment to those unit 
employees terminated as a result of the subcontracting of the District's busing and bus 
maintenance operation. 
3. Make unit employees whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result of such 
subcontracting, with interest to be paid at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
ODESSA-MONTOUR CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
J 
mis Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, 
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN7 S 
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, 
-Petitioner-, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4316 
NORTH PATCHOGUE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 342, Long Island 
Public Service Employees, United Marine Division, International 
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time: Firehouse 
Attendant, Senior Firehouse Attendant, 
Certification - C-4316 
Excluded: 
Automotive Equipment Operator, Emergency 
Medical Technician, Emergency Services 
Dispatcher, Custodial Worker I, Automotive 
Mechanic I,.Automotive Mechanic III. 
District Commissioner, District Treasurer, 
District Secretary, Assistant District 
Treasurer, and District Manager. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 342, Long Island 
Public Service Employees, United Marine Division, International 
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of•employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
D 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Paulyine R. Kinsella, Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF FISHKILL POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4333 
VILLAGE OF FISHKILL, 
Employer, 
-and-
NYS FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, 
Intervenor. 
) 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Fishkill Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
i exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
_shall_negpJtAat_e_j2o_lX^  
Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
L tic 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
ErzLe J. Schmertz, Member 
o y/cd/y^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GROVELAND HIGHWAY ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 117 0 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-4380 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
< above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Groveland Highway 
Association, Local 1170 Communications Workers of America has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
j Unit: Included: All full-time hourly employees of the Highway 
Department. 
-and-
TOWN OF GROVELAND, 
Certification - C-4380 
Excluded: Elected officials and supervisors. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Groveland Highway 
Association, Local 1170 Communications Workers of America. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
(/^yO^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memper 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PU3LIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
3D" 3/22/95 
In the Matter of 
PORT WASHINGTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 
STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4251 
PORT WASHINGTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees'.Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Port Washington Public 
Library Staff Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time, less than full-time, part-time 
and hourly employees of the Library who have 
worked a minimum of three hundred and fifty 
(350) hours in each of four (4) consecutive six 
(6) month periods immediately prior to the date 
of recognition of the Staff Association or 
thereafter work a minimum of three hundred and 
fifty (350) hours in each of four (4) 
consecutive six (6) month periods. 
Certification - C-4251 
Excluded: Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director, 
Assistant to the Director, Personnel Officer, 
Finance Officer, Assistant to the Finance 
Officer, .Internal Auditor, Administrative 
Secretarial staff to the Director, employees 
who work less than three hundred and fifty 
(350) hours in any six (6) month period, 
employees who are enrolled in high school, and 
all others not specifically included in the 
unit. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Port Washington Public 
Library Staff Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
f ^ t J v U t L J C f v c r f L 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
LAjL&y J * -— 
nbfer Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem: 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTHILL EMPLOYEES UNION, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-- CASE-NO CU4361 
WESTHILL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Westhill Employees Union, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the following titles who work 
12M hours per week or more: Teacher Aide, 
Custodial Worker I, Custodian II, Food Service 
Helper I, Food Service Helper/Baker, Cook 
Manager, Head Cook/Manager, Stenographer I, 
Stenographer II, Typist I, Typist II, Account 
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Clerk I, Head Groundsman, Groundsman, Courier, 
Print Center Aide, Transportation Clerk, 
Mechanic, Head Mechanic, Mechanics Helper. 
Excluded: Account Clerk/Typist II (Secretary to 
Assistant Superintendent for Business 
Administration) and all other employees. 
_F4JRT-HERV_I-T_IS—ORDERED_that_the_abo^-e_name.cL_p-ubll.c 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Westhill Employees 
Union, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
% J;^ % kK\J^i 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
- < - * 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
EDUCATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION 
JNEA/NY) ,_ 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3840 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Jefferson County Community 
Certification - C-3840 - 2 -
College Education Support Personnel Association (NEA/NY) has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
_p.ar_t±es_and_des_cxib.ed....b_e.lo.w.., a s . _ _ t h e i r _ _ e x c l u s i v e . _ r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
for the purpose of collective'negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the following titles employed 
at Jefferson County Community College: 
Custodian, Senior Custodian, Stenographer, 
Senior Stenographer, Building Maintenance 
Mechanic, Senior Building Maintenance Mechanic, 
Mail & Supply Clerk, Senior Typist, Typist, 
Library Typist, Account Clerk, Account Clerk 
Typist, Senior Account Clerk, Library Clerk, 
Senior Library Clerk, Keypunch Operator, 
Assistant DP Programmer, Data Processing 
Systems Analyst, Microcomputer Technician, 
Assistant Offset Print Machine Operator, 
Switchboard Operator, Laboratory Technician, 
Parking Lot.Attendant and Hospitality Training 
Manager. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Jefferson County Community 
College Education Support Personnel Association (NEA/NY). The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
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incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 22, 1995 
Albany, New York 
a lme R. Kmsel la , Pau in insell  Chairperson 
Uwcz.^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric Jy^Schmertz, Member 
